As a share of GDP, the U.S. Federal debt held by the public exceeds 50 percent in FY2009, the highest debt ratio since 1955. Projections indicate the debt ratio may be in the 70-100 percent range within ten years. In many respects, the temptation to inflate away some of this debt burden is similar to that at the end of World War II. In 1946, the debt ratio was 108.6 percent. Inflation reduced this ratio about 40 percent within a decade. Yet there are some important differences -shorter debt maturities today reduce the temptation to inflate, while the larger share held by foreigners increases it. This paper lays out an analytical framework for determining the impact of a large nominal debt overhang on the temptation to inflate. It suggests that when economic growth is stalled, the U.S. debt overhang may trigger an increase in inflation of about 5 percent for several years. This additional inflation would significantly reduce the debt ratio, even with some shortening of debt maturities. We are grateful to Doug Irwin for helpful comments and to Nick Lomanto for research assistance related to the appendix.
I. Introduction
Since the start of 2007, the financial crisis has triggered $1.62 trillion of write-downs and credit losses at U.S. financial institutions, sending the American economy into its deepest recession since the Great Depression and the global economy into its first recession since World War II. The Federal Reserve has responded aggressively. In an effort to hold down borrowing costs and boost lending, it has kept the target rate for overnight loans between banks at zero to 0.25 percent since December, 2008 , and it has pursued unconventional monetary easing. The United States is now facing large Federal deficits and growing public debt. The
Federal deficit, estimated at $1.4 trillion in FY2009, or 9.9% of GDP, is the highest deficit-to-GDP ratio since 1945.
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The Federal debt held by the public is expected to be over $6 trillion, or 53.8% of GDP, at the end of FY2009, the highest debt-to-GDP ratio since 1955. 4 The total outstanding Federal debt for FY2009 is predicted to exceed $11.8 trillion, about 90% of GDP. 5 The Budget of the United States Government, FY2009, p. 230, states: The Federal Government issues debt securities for two principal purposes. First, it borrows from the public to finance the Federal deficit. Second, it issues debt to Government accounts, primarily trust funds that accumulate surpluses. By law, trust fund surpluses must generally be invested in Federal securities. The gross Federal debt is defined as the sum of debt held by the If economic recovery is slow to take hold, large deficits and growing debt are likely to extend into future years. Not surprisingly, concerns about government deficits and public debt now dominate the policy debate.
Many observers worry that the debt/GDP ratios projected over the next ten years are unsustainable.
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Given that concern, and assuming that deficits can be reined in, how might the debt/GDP ratio be reduced? There are four basic mechanisms. First, GDP can grow rapidly enough to reduce the ratio. This scenario requires a robust economic recovery from the financial crisis. Second, inflation can rise, eroding the real value of the debt held by creditors and the effective debt ratio. With foreign creditors holding a significant share of the dollar-denominated U.S. Federal debt, they will share the burden of any higher U.S. inflation along with domestic creditors. 7 Third, the government can use tax revenue to redeem some of the debt. Fourth, the government can default on some of its debt obligations. Over its history, the United States has relied on each of these mechanisms to reduce its debt/GDP ratio. 8 In this paper, we examine the role of inflation in reducing the Federal government's debt burden.
We start in Section II by laying out some stylized facts. We examine Federal debt held by the public since World War II and show how publicly-held debt as a percentage of GDP has evolved. Since the impact of higher inflation on the debt/GDP ratio will depend on the maturity of the debt, we provide time-series evidence on average maturity length. We also observe that public and the debt held by Government accounts. Borrowing from the public is normally a good approximation of the Federal demand on credit markets. Borrowing must be financed out of the saving of households and businesses, the State and local sector, or the rest of the world. Borrowing from the public thus affects the size and composition of assets held by the private sector and the amount of saving imported from abroad. It also increases the amount of future resources required to pay interest to the public on Federal debt. Borrowing from the public and the growth of the publicly-held Federal debt are therefore important policy concerns.
6 For example, see Alan Auerbach and William Gale (2009) . 7 The real depreciation of the dollar also erodes the value of U.S. public debt held by foreigners. See Rogoff (2009).
8 For a brief discussion of debt management after the American Revolution and Civil War, see the Appendix.
very little of the debt is indexed to inflation, despite the introduction of Treasury inflationprotected securities (TIPS) in 1997, and all debt is denominated in dollars.
The distributional impact of inflation depends on the allocation of debt between domestic and foreign creditors, so we next show how the share held by foreigners has grown over time. We end this section by computing the impact of various inflation scenarios on the debt/GDP ratio, and we calculate how the inflation burden would be shared between domestic and foreign creditors.
In Section III, we develop a model that shows the impact of a nominal debt overhang on the temptation to inflate. The model illustrates that the optimal inflation rate is also positively related to the share of the debt held by foreign creditors, the cost of tax collection, and the share of non-indexed debt. Model simulations suggest that when economic growth is stalled, the U.S.
debt overhang may trigger an increase in inflation of about 5 present for several years. This additional inflation would significantly reduce the debt ratio, even with some shortening of debt maturities.
In Section IV, we conclude by comparing the current period with a past period in U.S.
history when the debt overhang was high. We argue that today's temptation to inflate away some of the debt burden is similar in some respects to that in 1945, when inflation successfully eroded a substantial part of the debt burden Yet there are important differences -shorter debt maturities today reduce the temptation to inflate, while the larger share held by foreign creditors increases it.
II. The Stylized Facts Returning to Figure 1 , we see that debt/GDP ratios stopped declining by the mid-1970s, when the economy was hit by oil shocks and fiscal deficits increased. In the early 1980s, the debt/GDP ratio grew sharply as the economy faced recession and a re-emerging fiscal deficit.
Legislated tax cuts and increased government defense expenditures fueled even greater fiscal deficits and higher debt.
By the mid-1990s, however, the debt/GDP ratio again began falling. A government that has lots of nominal debt denominated in its own currency has an incentive to try to inflate it away so as to decrease the debt burden. It will resist the urge to inflate if the rewards are small and the cost of a lost reputation is high. The average maturity of the debt and the share that is indexed to inflation affect the ability of the government to inflate away its value. In the extreme cases of zero maturity or fully-indexed debt, the government is unable to reduce its debt burden through inflation. Figure 4 illustrates the average maturity length for U.S. marketable interest-bearing public debt held by private investors, along with the debt held by the public as a share of GDP. In the past two years, the portion of Treasury debt at the shortest maturity has risen markedly. Figure 5 shows that the share of debt maturing in less than a year has jumped from about 30 percent to over 40 percent, reaching a proportion last seen in the mid-1980s.
Treasury inflation-protected securities, or TIPS, were first introduced in 1997 for notes and in 1998 for bonds. In nominal terms, they have increased from $24.4 billion in 1997 to $531.9 billion in June, 2009. However, as a share of total public debt, they are still quite small. Figure 6 shows that TIPS have grown in importance over the last 12 years but still account for less than 10 percent of total debt issues. below some threshold. We later test the validity of this assumption for U.S. data in the postWorld War II period. Figure 9 illustrates the percentage decline in the debt/GDP ratio (or the real value of the debt) of a one-, three-, and five-percent increase in inflation, assuming inflation stays at the higher rate for the life of the debt. Figure 10 pictures the impact of these three inflation scenarios on the share of publicly-held debt over the period 1946-2008. The estimated impact of inflation on today's debt/GDP ratio is larger than in the mid1970s but not as large as in the mid-1940s. Had inflation been 3 percent higher in FY2009 and stayed at that higher level over the average life of the debt (3.9 years in 2009), the effective debt/GDP ratio would be about 12 percent lower. Had inflation been 5 percent higher, the debt/GDP ratio would be about 20 percent lower, a debt ratio of 43.4 percent instead of 53.8 percent.
Figure 11 shows how a 3 percent increase in inflation would be shared between domestic and foreign holders of U.S. federal debt. In the 1960s, foreigners held so little debt that essentially the entire burden of higher inflation would fall on U.S. creditors. By the end of 2008, foreigners held almost half of the debt, so higher inflation would be shared about equally between domestic and foreign creditors.
Our computations of the impact of inflation on the debt overhang assume that all debt is denominated in domestic currency, none is indexed, and the maturity is invariant to inflation.
While the first two assumptions are sensible (U.S. public debt is 100 percent dollar-denominated and over 90 percent non-indexed), the latter assumption about the responsiveness of maturities to inflation needs further investigation.
Over the period 1946-2008, the simple correlation between U.S. debt maturities and consumer price inflation is -0.296, suggesting higher inflation is associated with lower debt maturities. However, regression results do not support this view. We describe a stylistic model that illustrates both costs and benefits associated with inflating away some of the debt burden. The model shows that the foreign share of the nominal debt is an important determinant of the optimal inflation rate. So is the size of the debt/GDP ratio, the share of debt indexed to inflation, and the cost of collecting taxes.
We consider an infinite-horizon economy that starts in period one with a public debt overhang. Previous inflation was low, say zero, such that a significant share of the public debt is not indexed to inflation. The average debt maturity is long enough to allow the authorities to contemplate unanticipated inflation as a way to erode the real debt. An inflation-inducing policy is costly, however. It will trigger in the next period the full indexation of the remaining public debt, and it will be associated with a drop in output during the inflationary-disinflationary cycle.
The period length coincides with the duration of a business cycle and/or an inflationarydisinflationary cycle (say four years for the U.S.).
To simplify, we assume away growth. Output in the absence of an inflationarydisinflationary cycle is Y . The initial outstanding debt in period one (the first period debt overhang) is bY . A fraction θ of the debt is de-facto indexed to inflation --either due to formal indexation (like TIPS) or to having almost instantaneous maturity.
The real interest rate in the absence of unanticipated inflation is determined by global conditions and is assumed to be exogenously given at level r. The rate is also the real interest rate on the indexed bonds. Hence, an unanticipated inflation rate of π > 0 in period one will reduce the real value of outstanding debt at the end of period one to (1 ) 1
A fraction ( 1-f ) of the initial debt is held by economic domestic actors, f by foreign economic actors. To simplify, we assume a symmetric ownership share of the indexed debt between domestic and foreign economic actors.
The penalty on attempts to inflate the debt in period one is that the remaining value of debt becomes real debt in period two and throughout the indefinite future -inflation in period one will induce private lenders to demand formal indexation or a sharp shortening of the maturity.
Output depends negatively on inflation:
The output is taxed at a rate t. For simplicity, the tax rate is set in period one and stays fixed for the indefinite future. Taxes are associated with deadweight losses, modeled in reduced form as a tax collection cost, τ. A tax rate t provides the authorities with net tax revenue of
These assumptions imply that if the authorities inflate in period one, they have the incentive to return to zero inflation for the indefinite future.
The consumer's utility is
The domestic consumer's financial wealth at the beginning of period one is
The second period initial asset position of the domestic consumer is:
18 Recalling that the period length coincides with the duration of an inflationary-disinflationary cycle, the values of h and φ capture the average output cost and indirectly the welfare cost of such a cycle. While, to our knowledge, there are no recent estimates of these values, Friedman (1985) estimated that the cost of 5 percentage points of disinflation over the 1980-1988 period was 20 point-years of unemployment, for a final trade-off of 4-to-1, toward the pessimistic end of Okun's range. He noted that it was possible to construct a more favorable picture on the basis of more optimistic assumptions, for a final trade-off of 2-1, about at the optimistic end of Okun's range.
Assuming that anticipated first-period inflation is zero, a positive inflation in period one implies that all debt in the future will be indexed. The budget constraint in period s, s > 1, will be: Forward iterations imply that the intertemporal budget constraints can be reduced to:
The left-hand side of Equation (6) is first-period wealth. The representative consumer maximizes utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, where the net present value of the consumption stream equals the consumer's first period wealth:
Assuming an exogenously given interest rate, it follows that the resulting utility is proportional to initial wealth.
The policy maker will set the inflation rate and the tax rate in order to maximize the representative consumer's first-period wealth, subject to the fiscal intertemporal budget constraint. We assume an exogenous fiscal expenditure of gY each period. Hence, the fiscal intertemporal budget constraints are: 
Alternatively, The left-hand side of (9) is the flow of taxes per dollar income net of collection costs. It should cover the "long run" fiscal expense share of the GDP, namely Γ . In the absence of inflation and debt overhang, the right-hand side of (9) is simply g. If g is zero, then in the absence of inflation the right-hand side is the annuity value of the public debt overhang as a fraction of permanent output, 1 r b r + .
The fiscal budget constraint provides the tax Laffer curve: The policy maker sets the inflation rate so as to maximize the consumer's wealth, ( 1 W ), subject to the Laffer curve constraint, (10). Specifically, the policy maker's problem is:
It follows that for an internal equilibrium --one with positive inflation --we get:
Higher debt overhang (a higher debt/GDP ratio, b) increases the incentive to inflate in the first period in order to reduce the deadweight losses associated with conventional taxes. A greater foreign share of the debt overhang ( f ) increases the attractiveness of the inflation tax since it increases the share of the tax paid by foreign lenders. Less efficient tax collection (bigger τ ) increases the gain associated with the inflation tax. Higher fiscal expenditure (g) is associated with a higher tax rate t as well as higher inflation. Higher indexation (θ ) reduces the efficacy of inflation as an implicit tax, thereby increasing the explicit tax rate, t. . If h=1 and φ=1.15, an inflation of 5 percent is associated with an output cost during the inflation-disinflation cycle of about 3 percent of GDP. The inflation rate predicted by the model depends critically on the assumed inflation cost. Above some threshold inflation, these costs may arguably accelerate. In another context, Bruno and Easterly (1998) show that the cost of inflation increases above some threshold.
IV. Conclusion
A lesson to take from the model and the simulations is that eroding the debt through inflation is not farfetched. The model predicts that a moderate inflation of 6 percent could reduce the debt/GDP ratio by 20 percent within 4 years. That inflation rate is only slightly higher than the average observed after World War II. Of course, inflation projections would be much higher than 6 percent if the share of publicly-held debt in the U.S. were to approach the 100 percent range observed at the end of World War II. Hence, while moderate inflation may help reduce today's debt burden, it is a much less powerful tool for addressing long-term fiscal challenges.
The current period shares two features with the immediate post-war period. It starts with a large debt overhang and low inflation. Both factors increase the temptation to erode the debt burden through inflation.
Even so, there are two important differences between the periods. Today, a much greater share of the public debt is held by foreign creditors-48 percent instead of zero. This large foreign share increases the temptation to inflate away some of the debt.
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Another important difference is that today's debt maturity is less than half what it was in 1946-3.9 years instead of 9. Shorter maturities reduce the temptation to inflate. These two competing factors appear to offset each other, and the net result in a simple optimizing model is a projected inflation rate slightly higher than that experienced after World War II, but for a shorter duration.
In the model simulation, we raised a concern about the stability of some parameters across periods, particularly the parameters that capture the cost of inflation. It may be that the cost of inflation is higher today because globalization and the greater ease of foreign direct 21 Figure 12 suggests that if all debt today were held by domestic creditors (f= 0), projected inflation would be zero. Thus, 'tax your neighbor' is a key feature of the inflationary bias suggested by the model. Of course, with a higher debt/GDP ratio approaching IMF estimates of b = 1, inflation could be positive even with f = 0. investment provide new options for producers to move activities away from countries with greater uncertainty. Inflation above some threshold could generate this uncertainty, reducing further the attractiveness of using inflation to erode the debt.
Moreover, history suggests that a modest inflation may increase the risk of an unintended inflation acceleration to double digit levels, as happened in 1947, and in 1979-1981. Such an outcome often results in an abrupt and costly adjustment down the road.
22 Accelerating inflation had limited global implications at a time when the public debt was held domestically and the U.S. was the undisputed global economic leader. In contrast, unintended acceleration of inflation to double digit levels in the future may have unintended adverse effects, including growing tensions with global creditors and less reliance on the dollar.
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22 Such a cycle is also politically costly because U.S. savers are exposed to another volatile cycle in their retirement and savings accounts. 23 For the threat to the dollar from the Euro, see Chinn and Frankel (2008) . erode the debt/GDP ratio in the aftermath of these wars. We find that inflation played virtually no role. Instead, GNP growth and tariff revenue applied to redeeming debt principal and interest reduced the debt ratio in the aftermath of these major conflicts.
Debt as a Percent of GDP

Revolutionary War Period. The Congress and the states financed most of The
War of Independence (1776-1781) by issuing paper money, resulting in a rapid inflation and currency depreciation. Although the war was about 85 percent financed by money printing, the government also borrowed funds, mostly from its own citizens, though the French government and Dutch investors also provided some loans.
The U.S. Congress first started borrowing in October, 1776. The interest rate offered was 4 percent, payable in specie or its equivalent in foreign bills of exchange, and the certificates had a 3-year maturity. In February, 1777, to attract investors, the interest rate was raised to 6 percent and the new securities had no fixed maturity dates. The 3-year certificates previously issued were not retired on schedule, since redemption funds were nonexistent; instead, they were converted into open-ended obligations as well. In
March 1778, the offer to pay interest in specie was withdrawn and holders were promised interest payments merely in currency. 24 In the 1780s, holders received interest payments in IOUs. Since no one knew when congressional debts would be repaid, or when and in what form interest payments would be forthcoming, the securities traded at large discounts. Even in the mid-1780s, sellers of federal securities received very low prices, often ten to fifteen cents on the dollar.
In 1789, after the ratification of a new Constitution and the inauguration of the first President, Alexander Hamilton was appointed Secretary of the Treasury. He reported to Congress in January, 1790. He stated that the federal domestic debt was roughly $40 million, consisting of $27 million in original principal plus $13 million in accrued interest. Another $12 million was owed to foreign creditors.
Hamilton made several recommendations to Congress. He proposed federal assumption of the remaining wartime debts of the states, which would increase the size of the debt by another $18 to $25 million (ultimately it was $18 million, bringing the total federal debt to $70 million, about 27 percent of GNP). He proposed converting all outstanding debt securities into specie-denominated securities at the official par of exchange. The essence of Hamilton's proposal was to defer repayment of debt principal indefinitely but resume interest payments (the $13 million in arrears) in specie.
Hamilton believed that it would make little difference to investors that the bonds had no fixed maturity dates as long as the government pledged to maintain regular interest payments. His calculation that funding interest payments would drive up bond prices (close to par) and reduce yields proved correct. To generate the revenues to cover the interest on the national debt, Hamilton proposed a tax program that relied primarily on an import tariff. With the war over, Congress gave the Secretary of the Treasury authority to convert short-term notes into long-term bonds and begin retiring greenbacks (Bolles, 1886) . In 1869, it authorized the payment of all interest-bearing obligations in "hard money"-specie. Tax revenue generated primarily through the import tariff was used to pay interest on the debt and a certain amount of the principal each year. By 1880, the public debt had been reduced substantially (the debt/GNP ratio was under 20 percent), through a combination of economic growth and tax revenue targeted at paying interest and principal on the debt. 25 For more on war financing and debt management during the American Revolutionary War period, see Calomiris (1988) , Myers (1970) , Perkins (1994) and Stabile and Cantor (1991) . 26 After the Civil War, foreigners began purchasing U.S. government debt. By the end of 1866, they held 13 percent of the public debt. By 1869, they held about 48 percent (Stabile and Cantor, 1991) .
